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Background: Globally, injuries cause approximately as many deaths per year as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria
combined, and 90% of injury deaths occur in low- and middle- income countries. Given not all injuries kill, the
disability burden, particularly from orthopaedic injuries, is much higher but is poorly measured at present. The
orthopaedic services and orthopaedic medical devices needed to manage the injury burden are frequently
unavailable in these countries. Corruption is known to be a major barrier to access of health care, but its effects on
access to orthopaedic services is still unknown.
Methods: A qualitative case study of 45 open-ended interviews was conducted to investigate the access to
orthopaedic health services and orthopaedic medical devices in Uganda. Participants included orthopaedic
surgeons, related healthcare professionals, industry and government representatives, and patients. Participants’
experiences in accessing orthopaedic medical devices were explored. Thematic analysis was used to analyze and
code the transcripts.
Results: Analysis of the interview data identified poor leadership in government and corruption as major barriers to
access of orthopaedic care and orthopaedic medical devices. Corruption was perceived to occur at the worker,
hospital and government levels in the forms of misappropriation of funds, theft of equipment, resale of drugs and
medical devices, fraud and absenteeism. Other barriers elicited included insufficient health infrastructure and
human resources, and high costs of orthopaedic equipment and poverty.
Conclusions: This study identified perceived corruption as a significant barrier to access of orthopaedic care and
orthopaedic medical devices in Uganda. As the burden of injury continues to grow, the need to combat corruption
and ensure access to orthopaedic services is imperative. Anti-corruption strategies such as transparency and
accountability measures, codes of conduct, whistleblower protection, and higher wages and benefits for workers
could be important and initial steps in improving access orthopaedic care and OMDs, and managing the global
injury burden.Background
The global injury burden is severely underappreciated by
the global health and surgical communities. Orthopaedic
injuries and disease account for 14% of the world’s
DALYs (Disability Adjusted Life Years) lost and 9% of
the world’s mortality according to WHO estimates [1].* Correspondence: maryse.bouchard@gmail.com
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bidity and mortality of a condition, by adding the years of
life lost because of premature mortality with the healthy
years of life lost because of disability [2]. The burden of
chronic disability is large compared with premature mor-
tality, but remains poorly measured. Ninety percent of
injury deaths occur in low- and middle-income countries
[3]. Globally, injuries cause approximately as many deaths
per year as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria combined
[4]. By 2020, road traffic crashes are expected to be the
leading cause of DALYs worldwide [4]. By the year 2030,
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disability globally [5]. This is an area that has surprisingly
not been a global health priority; we hope this paper will
draw much needed global attention to this issue.
Timely access to appropriate orthopaedic care can
prevent death, and disability due to infections, permanent
deformities, chronic pain, or inability to ambulate [6]. As
many orthopaedic procedures require an orthopaedic
medical device (OMD), such as plaster, an external fixator
or an implant [6], accessibility and availability of these
devices are essential.
A qualitative case study was conducted in Uganda in
November and December 2010, investigating the accessibil-
ity of OMDs. Interviews explored participants’ perceptions
of the major barriers to availability of OMDs and solutions
for improving access. The global governance and global
health literature confirm that corruption is a major impedi-
ment to access of health care in low-income countries [7].
This paper is the first to explore how corruption specifically
hinders access to orthopaedic care and orthopaedic medical
devices, and exacerbates the global injury burden.
Corruption in the health care sector
Corruption, as defined by Transparency International, is
the “abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (p.xvii)
[8]. With health care expenditures totaling 3 trillion US
dollars globally, this sector is particularly vulnerable to
corruption [8]. In health care, there is a significant diver-
sity of services offered, and a large scale and expense
associated with procurement [9]. In addition, the nature
of health care is such that the demand is not fully pre-
dictable and often exceeds supply [9]. Health care
systems also tend to have weak or non-existent rules
and regulations, lack of accountability, information imbal-
ances between providers and patients and suppliers and
providers, and low salaries for health care professionals
and public officials [7]. These characteristics of the health
sector make it susceptible to corruption. Corruption has
been well documented in the health sector in Uganda. A
study in Uganda reported that the resale of pharmaceuti-
cals is the greatest source of income for health care
workers [10]. In Uganda, it is estimated that over two-
thirds of drugs meant for free distribution in the public
sector were lost due to theft or went unaccounted for, and
that 68-77% of formal user charges were misappropriated
or pocketed by workers [11]. In 2005, the Global Fund for
HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis suspended all dona-
tions to Uganda when over 1.6 million US dollars of
grants went missing [12]. To date, two Ugandan officials
have been accused and sentenced for the embezzlement of
Global Fund monies [13].
Theft, diversion and resale of drugs are other sources
of corruption documented to occur at the distribution
point of pharmaceutical supply chain [9]. For example,there can be theft without falsification of inventory
records, dispensing of drugs to patients who did not
actually attend the pharmacy or clinic, recording of
drugs as dispensed to legitimate patients but the patients
do not receive them, and dispensing of drugs to patients
who pay for them but the health care provider keeps the
funds for themself [14]. Corruption in orthopaedics was
an uncommon topic in academic literature and non-
medical media until the announcement of a large-scale
lawsuit in the United States in 2005. The Department of
Justice’s U.S. State Attorney for the District of New
Jersey brought forth allegations against the five largest
orthopaedic device manufacturers for illegal kickbacks
to surgeons and false claims allegations. Physicians were
allegedly awarded vacations, gifts and annual “consulting
fees” as high as $200,000 in return for physician endor-
sements of their implants or use of them in operations
[15]. The false claims were concerning illegal promo-
tions of off-label uses for a certain product. These five
companies control 95% of the orthopaedic medical de-
vice market [15]. Four of those companies paid 311 mil-
lion US dollars to settle the case [15]. Many of the
individual orthopaedic surgeons are the subjects of
investigations as well.
The medical device industry, especially in orthopae-
dics, is an area where there are relatively large sums of
money involved and thus a susceptibility to corruption
[9]. Corruption within orthopaedic services and industry
may inflate prices of equipment, lower the quality of
care and products, and impede the necessary response
to alleviating the growing global injury burden. Previous
reports have established that corruption is present in the
health care system in Uganda, and in the orthopaedic
device system elsewhere. We are aware of no prior work
studying corruption in the orthopaedic device system in
Uganda, nor in any similar country. This case study con-
ducted in Uganda identifies the areas in which ortho-
paedic services are susceptible to corruption and how it
affects patient care. The data also suggest mechanisms
that can be applied as anti- corruption measures.
Methods
To explore the phenomenon of access to OMDs in low-
income countries, a descriptive qualitative case study
was undertaken in Uganda in November and December
2010. Open-ended interviews were used to elicit the
experiences of key informants in accessing OMDs. Given
the limited literature on the subject, this approach was
chosen given it is useful for extracting information and
investigating a phenomenon for which little is known
[16]. Importantly, case studies are subject to less bias
than other qualitative methodologies, as preconceived
theories are not easily imposed on the data [17]. Uganda
was selected for the case study as it has a similar health
Table 1 Study sample participants
Sample sub-group Number of participants
(% of Total sample)
Health care workers 29 (65%)
Orthopedic surgeons 16 (36%)
Other health care workers 13 (29%)
Health care administrators 2 (4%)
Government officials 2 (4%)
Hospital administrators 0 (0%)
Patients 6 (13%)
Industry representatives 8 (18%)
Public practice on 18 (51%)
Private practice only 3 (9%)
Public and private practice 14 (40%)
Academic affiliation or institution 19 (54%)
No academic affiliation 16 (46%)
Urban practice location 24 (53%)
Rural Practice location 21 (47%)
Practice in Uganda 38 (84%)
Practice in other Africa country* 7 (16%)
*Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, and South Africa.
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and experiences many of the economic constraints
common to such settings [18].
Sampling
To collect the most information-rich data, purposive
sampling and snowball sampling were employed. Four
categories of participants were pre-selected: 1) surgeons
who perform orthopaedic procedures and other related
healthcare professionals; 2) hospital administrators and
government officials responsible for procuring OMDs; 3)
orthopaedic patients; and 4) orthopaedic industry repre-
sentatives. Participants were chosen to ensure the sam-
ple represented professionals and patients from urban
and rural areas, academic and district hospitals, and
public and private hospitals. The primary unit of sam-
pling was the health centre. There are only 28 ortho-
paedic surgeons in Uganda [19] and they are mostly
concentrated in the capital city, but are also present in
some district, mission, non- governmental and private
hospitals in rural areas of the country. Within each
health centre, we attempted to identify and interview
representatives of each category of participant, if present.
A small number of interviews were conducted at the
international meeting of the College of Surgeons of Cen-
tral, Eastern and Southern Africa (COSECSA). Given
that not all participants could be identified prior to com-
mencing the study in Uganda, snowball sampling was
required. The sample size was determined using the sat-
uration principle [20]. Although snowball sampling may
lead to bias by people with similar views being more
likely to know each other, we believe that interviewing
more than half the orthopaedic surgeons in the country
severely restricted this form of bias.
Data collection
Data collection was achieved through open-ended semi-
structured interviews conducted by the first author. For
example, the first question for each interview broadly
asked participants to describe their experience in acces-
sing orthopaedic medical devices in their hospital. All
interviews were recorded with hand-written notes and
transcribed by the same author. Although the original
intent had been to digitally audio record the interviews,
the interview settings were often noisy and informants
were more forthcoming with information when the digital
audio recorder was off. Note-taking therefore became the
preferred method of recording. This is in keeping with
experiences in other studies [21]. To contextualise the
interview data, the first author participated in clinical ac-
tivities and kept a journal as observational field notes.
Written and oral informed consent was obtained from
all participants prior to their participation in the inter-
view process. Research ethics approval was obtainedfrom the Institutional Review Boards at the University of
Toronto, the home institution of the authors, and
Makerere University in Kampala, Uganda. This study
was conducted in compliance with the guidelines of the
Helsinki Declaration.
Data analysis
The qualitative method of thematic analysis was used to
analyze the data. This method identifies, analyses and
describes patterns and themes within data [22]. Nvivo 9
Software was used to create a database to organize, code
and categorize the collected interview data. According to
the methodology described by Fereday and Muir-
Cochrane [23], the first step of coding was to review the
data. This involved transcribing, re-reading and, sum-
marizing each interview, and tabulating the participants’
demographics. The second step of coding, and the third
step of grouping codes into themes, were performed
simultaneously. Finally, themes were condensed into
over-arching categories that represented and accurately
explained the data set.
Results
Forty-five interviews were conducted in 12 healthcare
centers across Uganda. Table 1 summarizes the study
sample demographics. Participants included 16 ortho-
paedic surgeons, 13 health care professionals who were
not orthopaedic surgeons, 8 industry representatives, 6
patients, and 2 government officials. Fifty-one percent of
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tions, 54% of the healthcare professionals worked in
academic centers, and 49% had a part-time or full-time
private practice. Seven of the participants practiced sur-
gery in African countries other than Uganda. These
interviews were conducted to include regional context,
specifically to find out whether Uganda was unique, or
was similar to its neighbors. The purpose was not to
study Africa in general, nor to extend the present results
beyond Uganda. Few government officials were available
for interview. This is not surprising given the sensitive
nature of the topic.
Data analysis produced hundreds of codes and dozens
of themes. Dominant and important themes stated by
the majority of participants can be found in Table 2.
Codes and themes were condensed and revealed two
overarching categories, as seen in Figure 1: Barriers to
access of orthopaedic services and OMDs, and mechan-
isms for improving access to orthopaedic care. Of the
four major barriers, poor leadership and corruption was
the most unexpected but significant finding. The three
other themes were high costs of OMDs and poverty,
inadequate human resources and training, and inefficient
and insufficient healthcare infrastructure. The second
category on improving access to orthopaedic care identi-
fied policies for prioritizing orthopaedic services, train-
ing of more orthopaedic specialists, and the adoption of
strategies for raising funds for orthopaedics. The discussion
of this paper focuses on the theme of corruption and
explores the participant-elicited policies and funding
strategies that could serve as anti- corruption mechanisms.Table 2 Sample of preliminary codes and themes from
interview data
Line-by-line codes Number of references
in coded text
Cost of OMDs 32
Local manufacturing 32





Availability and Accessibillty of OMDs 19
Lack of heath infrastructure 17
Procurement 17
Policies to prioritize ortho and trauma 14
Reallocation of health care dollars 13
Need more specialists 12
Policies and law enforcement 12Discussion
Barriers to orthopaedic care and medical devices
One of the largest identified obstacles in providing ap-
propriate care to injured patients was perceived corrup-
tion. Participants easily identified many of the corrupt
practices common to the health care sector at worker,
hospital and government levels. These included mis-
appropriation of funds, theft of equipment, resale of
drugs and medical devices, fraud and absenteeism. They
expressed the need for anti-corruption measures and
improved transparency in government.
Misappropriation of funds
Participants reported theft and misuse of resources both
financial and material. Both government funds and
grants from donor agencies were reported as lost or mis-
appropriated.
“Money in the government is not always accounted
for and doesn’t always make it to the hospitals.”
[Health care professional]
“There is a lot of corruption and wasted money in the
government. For example, here there is a 60 000 US
dollar Toyota Prado for the medical superintendent to
use. It sits in the front of the hospital. It was bought
by the government. I see the superintendent use it
maybe only once or twice a day” [Health care
professional]
“Why can people afford to buy 4x4s but not pay for
their health care? In the end, I think that all East
African countries can afford [orthopaedic] implants if
they use their public money properly. There is so
much wasted money.” [Industry representative]
Participants also identified a lack of transparency and
accountability in government policy decisions (particu-
larly for health budget allocation) and procedures in the
health system. A dominant theme identified was the lack
of publicly disclosed oversight of government procure-
ment procedures. Donated funds are typically associated
with a higher degree of oversight and accountability, and
one participant suggested that donated funds for health
care might encourage more transparency.
Theft and resale of drugs and medical equipment
In Uganda’s universal healthcare system, the government
attempts to supply all its hospitals with the necessary
equipment and medicines. Hospitals can access what
they need through the National Medical Stores, a centra-
lized depot of medical supplies run and paid for by the
government [24]. The National Medical Stores however,
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Figure 1 Overarching categories from interview data.
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donated supplies. Many other supplies and drugs are
also frequently out of stock or cost more than hospitals
or patients can afford.
“[There is] corruption. The health care budget has a
budget for sutures, but when we ask for them they
never come.” [Health care professional]
Depleted stocks and high costs force hospitals, physicians
and patients to buy from private pharmacies or distributors
(Observational Field Notes). This can also incite theft.
Stolen orthopaedic implants, donated or government sup-
plied, are reported taken from public hospitals and resold
to patients in private hospitals (Observational Field Notes).
The lack of inventory systems, clear policies, price lists,
and oversight mechanisms make the health care system
vulnerable to corrupt practices.
“There is theft of equipment in government hospitals
by people who want to set up their own practice.
Some stolen instruments are consumables but some
are permanent fixtures.” [Health care professional]
Interviews with orthopaedic industry representatives
and orthopaedic surgeons who work in other low-in-
come countries reveal the problems of theft and resale
also exist outside Uganda. These participants relate the
problems of theft to the lack of suppliers of medical
equipment, making medical devices difficult to come by
even in legitimate ways.
“Once in the 1970’s, Synthes [one of the big five
orthopaedic medical device manufacturers] set up a
plant in India. Everything they made in India was sent
directly to Switzerland, so it could not be sold directlyto the market. The labor was really cheap but the
quality was the same. But they closed the plant
because the manager in India started selling directly
to the market. I have tried to convince them to set up
a plant in Kenya so Africans can have better access to
implants, but they say ‘we don’t want to start a plant
here’. They fear their products will end up on the
black market.” [Industry representative]
Fraud
Uganda, like most low-income countries, has a serious lack
of orthopaedic specialists, from surgeons to orthopaedic
officers and nurses [19]. There are only 28 orthopaedic
surgeons in Uganda [19], and only a handful in rural areas
[25]. There is no provision to encourage healthcare profes-
sionals to work in underserviced areas; this is not uncom-
mon for many health professions. The government will not
fund orthopaedic care or supply orthopaedic equipment to
a hospital if there is no orthopaedic surgeon present,
compounding this problem. Health care professionals and
government officials in many low-income countries are
paid meager wages and are rarely rewarded for exceptional
performance [26]. The median surgeon salary in a public
hospital setting is $6000USD per year, while it is $18000
per year in a private setting [25]. In contrast, the median
annual income for a ward nurse is $1000 [25]. Under these
conditions, many workers engage in other economic activ-
ities during working hours or pursue opportunities for
financial gain through public service, including the accept-
ance of informal payments [9]. One study participant
described that in Ethiopia, even private hospitals practice
corrupt behaviors in order to make private gains. In this
case, it is by overcharging patients for medical equipment.
“The private hospital will charge a patient the same
whether they use an Indian [generic] or European
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which one they want, the hospital will use the
cheapest device, charge for the most expensive, and
take the extra money.” [Health care professional]
In Uganda, as hospital stocks are often depleted,
patients are frequently asked to buy drugs or equipment
from private distributors. Patients worry however,
whether they are getting the best price for the medical
equipment and drugs they need. The low wages, lack of
benefits, and poorly supplied hospitals of the public
health care system motivate surgeons to work in the pri-
vate system partially or exclusively. Fiftyeight percent of
all medical professionals interviewed in Uganda worked
at least parttime in the private system. Many participants
reported needing the income from the private system to
support their families (Observational Field Notes). Even
though we focus on corruption in this paper, it is im-
portant to note that fraud in the forms of informal pay-
ments and absenteeism are often viewed as coping
mechanisms for health professionals given their low sal-
aries in the public sector.
The current private system negatively affects the public
system. The first author participated in clinical care and in
the orthopedic operating room while in Uganda. In the lar-
ger cities, the operating room rarely started before 11 AM
as the nurse, anesthetist or surgeon was coming from an
earlier case at a private hospital (Observational Field
Notes). Other times, delays were simply because of lack of
motivation from the staff. Since they were salaried it did
not matter to them financially how many cases per day they
achieved (Observational Field Notes). The growing list of
patients waiting for surgery did not seem to inspire the staff
to work harder or longer. These findings are consistent
with other studies on absenteeism and health worker mo-
tivation [7]. Furthermore, there is a significant increased
cost to the government and public health sector when such
absenteeism occurs. Although meager, the government-paid
salaries for full-time health care professionals ultimately
pay for only part-time employees when workers spend up
to half of their time in a private hospital instead providing
undivided care in the public sector. The resulting backlog
of patients waiting for care and occupying hospital beds for
longer periods also increase health care costs and poten-
tially negatively impact patient outcomes.
We found that another consequence of absenteeism is
a slowdown in the procurement system for medical
devices. All procurement in Uganda is through a lengthy
government process (Observational Field Notes,). Ab-
senteeism of physicians and government officials on the
procurement committees further slows the process.
“The supply procurement process is incredible. To
prevent corruption, there are two to three committeesat the district and hospital levels you have to submit
your request to. The process takes 6 to 8 months. It
always has to go through the government. It can
happen that the committees don’t meet because
people are away. This can create yearlong delays.
When you finally get the tender, sometimes the
supplier in the end is not able to supply, then you
have to start all over again.” [Health care professional]Law enforcement
Although corruption in law enforcement is not directly
related to corrupt behavior in the health sector, most
cases of orthopaedic trauma are due to road traffic
crashes and lack of regulation on the road. There is little
consequence for reckless or unsafe driving because the
police rarely halt or prevent it, or alternatively because
there is a lack of policy or legislation against a particular
act of dangerous driving.
“Law enforcement here is not good. No traffic rules are
enforced. Careless driving is performed by everyone
here, rich or poor.” [Health care professional]
For example, boda-bodas are the motorcycle taxis in
Uganda. A law exists that mandates drivers to wear hel-
mets. Few drivers where helmets, and yet the police rarely
discipline the drivers (Observational Field Notes).
Participants hypothesized that similar to health care,
police are poorly paid and inadequately rewarded for
good performance, they may be unmotivated to properly
perform their jobs and more likely to accept bribes or
other forms of personal gain. This is also a result of a
lack of monitoring and enforcement of professional stan-
dards.
“We need increased police enforcement, but I don’t
know how to increase their interest. Maybe the police
aren’t supervised well, they don’t have enough money
or high enough salaries, and they don’t have enough
knowledge.” [Government Official]
Many participants related corruption in law enforcement
as a barrier to access of orthopaedic care as the unpun-
ished reckless driving consistently causes the disabling and
fatal injuries that overload the emergency rooms, wards
and operating rooms.Adapting Uganda’s health care system to respond
to the injury burden by preventing corruption
There is no one-size-fits-all solution to eradicating corrup-
tion [7]. A society is less vulnerable to corruption when
there is rule of law, transparency, trust, and strong account-
ability mechanisms [8]. Anti-corruption measures must be
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context, and health care system [8].
Preventative measures against corruption can include
procurement guidelines, inspection for quality of med-
ical technologies and drugs, codes of conduct for indivi-
duals, institutions and industries, and transparency and
monitoring procedures [8].
Study participants called for policies that would deter
corrupt behaviors.
“We need to lobby the government to change the
attitude towards theft [in the health care setting]. And
if we can exclude theft [in the hospitals], we can then
tell the government with certainty we used all [the
supplies] we have, that it wasn’t enough, and we need
more for legitimate reasons and not because staff is
stealing.” [Health care professional]
Klitgaard [27] describes three phases in overcoming
corruption. First, raising awareness through education of
the public, and of decision and policy makers. Second,
conducting analyses of points most vulnerable to cor-
ruption. Last, determining what prevention strategies
would be most effective. To prevent corruption that hin-
ders access to orthopaedic care and medical devices, sev-
eral mechanisms might need to be developed.
Reducing incentives of corrupt practices by health care
workers
Corrupt behaviors such as absenteeism, theft, fraud, and
acceptance of bribes and informal payments have been
shown to decrease when health care professionals are
paid decent wages proportional to their education, skills
and training [8]. Governments can also reduce the oc-
currence of corruption by monitoring payment schemes,
adopting codes of conduct [8], increasing the role of
community committees and public scrutiny, and per-
forming analyses of and providing report cards for pub-
lic services are suggested mechanisms [9].
Anti-corruption strategies in the pharmaceutical and
medical device industries
The corruption literature identifies several strategies for
preventing corrupt behaviors in the pharmaceutical sec-
tor. These could also be applied to the medical device
industry and include:
1) Criteria for selection and pricing based on global
standards (eg WHO) [28]
2) Professional and public scrutiny of device selection
committees [9]
3) Transparent, written, explicit procurement criteria [28]
4) Media publication of tender results [28]
5) Industry codes of conduct [7]6) Licensing and inspection of pharmaceutical and
medical device suppliers [28]
Of particular concern in Uganda is that all medical
devices and drugs for the public health system must be
procured and distributed through the government’s
National Medical Stores. This system is vulnerable to cor-
ruption. The government is the sole regulator. If improp-
erly used or controlled this could enable corruption,
whereas if properly used and managed it can discourage
corruption. Clarification of chains of authority and ac-
countability processes should be encouraged to ensure
ethical business practices [9].
Strategies for improving transparency
The literature on corruption in health care and participants
of the Ugandan case study both call for effective mechan-
isms for improving accountability and transparency in the
health sector. The 2006 Global Corruption Report from
Transparency International suggested several immediate
strategies [8]. Transparency could be improved with regu-
lar publishing of information on health budgets and per-
formance at the national, local and health delivery center
levels; independent audits of health funds, coordination of
international donor support to the health sector with regu-
lar evaluations of their programs in terms of health out-
comes, and not level or speed of disbursement. There
could also be mechanisms for implementing public over-
sight of government policies, practices and expenditures.
Improved transparency and accountability will ideally dis-
courage embezzlement, theft of medical equipment, and
fraud and bribery among government officials, law enforce-
ment officers and health care workers.
Strategies for creating and implementing codes of
conduct
Codes of conduct for health care workers, government
officials and industry are required to define appropriate
practice in the health care sector, and to deter or punish
corrupt behaviour. Codes of conduct should be imple-
mented and promoted through continued training and
enforcement [8]. These codes should make explicit refer-
ence to preventing corruption and conflicts of interest [8].
Codes of conduct will be meaningless however, if health
care workers are not being paid a fair living wage for their
work [28].
Whistleblower protection
Governments should introduce whistleblower protection
for individuals in procurement bodies, health authorities,
health service providers and suppliers of medicines and
equipment [8]. Pharmaceutical and medical device com-
panies should do the same. Corrupt practices by indivi-
duals, government or industry should be punished, and
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participation in future tendering processes with the
government [8]. Conversely, good behavior should be
rewarded and publicized [7].Reducing incentives for corruption through alternative
funding of the health care budget
With a limited health care budget, hospitals and the
governments are susceptible to corruption. The partici-
pants’ suggestions of innovative strategies for funding
orthopaedic care may provide new opportunities for finan-
cing health care that promote better transparency and
accountability.
“We could put a levy on fuel and vehicles, as drivers
and riders are those most involved in road traffic
crashes. This money would go directly into
orthopaedics for implants and other [OMDs], for
salaries to increase motivation and increase the
working hours, and for improved call coverage to
sustain a 24hour operating theatre.” [Health care
professional]
“We can use profits from private surgeries in
government hospitals to raise funds for public care.
Public hospitals can generate their own money
through a private wing.” [Health care professional]
These innovative funding strategies may not in them-
selves prevent corruption, but if coupled with improved
accountability and transparency, significant progress can
be made.Conclusions
Our qualitative case study of orthopaedic services in
Uganda has shown that one of the largest barriers to
access of much needed orthopaedic and trauma care is
corruption. This was the most unexpected but signifi-
cant finding of the qualitative study. Corruption in the
health care sector has been repeatedly shown to hinder
access to needed health services. This is no exception
for orthopaedic care. Corruption occurs at the worker,
hospital and government levels in the forms of mis-
appropriation of funds, theft of equipment, resale of
drugs and medical devices, and fraud. Orthopaedic care
is also affected by corruption in law enforcement. As the
global burden of injury continues to grow, the need to
combat corruption and ensure access to orthopaedic ser-
vices and medical devices increases. Anti- corruption
strategies such as improving transparency and account-
ability measures in policy, procurement, and payment
schemes, codes of conduct, whistleblower protection,
and higher wages and benefits for workers could be thefirst step in improving access orthopaedic care and man-
aging the global injury burden.
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